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The Non-Consequentialist Uses of Economic 
Analysis: A Comment on Dagan and Kreitner, 
Economic Analysis in Law 
Lewis A. Kornhauser† 
Introduction 
Dagan and Kreitner have offered a rich and elegantly written discus-
sion of the normative uses of economic analysis of law.1 For Dagan and 
Kreitner, a scholar uses economic analysis normatively either when she 
evaluates a legal rule or institution or when she makes policy recommen-
dations. These two normative uses of economic analysis are closely related 
but distinct. Evaluation often starts from some ideal theory while policy 
design is clearly non-ideal. Moreover, in policy design, questions of insti-
tutional competence and capacity play a central role that they do not have 
in straightforward evaluation. I do not, however, pursue these distinctions 
here. 
Evaluative approaches divide into two classes: consequentialist and 
non-consequenetialist. Dagan and Kreitner discuss the role of economic 
analysis in both classes. The role of economic analysis in consequentialist 
evaluation and design flows naturally from economic methodology. Any 
consequentialist evaluation or policy design requires a theory of how indi-
viduals, both private citizens and public officials, behave in response to le-
gal rules. Economic analysis of law offers the most clearly elaborated and 
developed theory of such behavior. In addition, the structure of the theory 
provides a natural way to make welfarist evaluations as the theory explains 
behavior in terms of the preferences of the agents.2  
Dagan and Kreitner describe in Part II a number of inarguably rea-
sonable uses of economic analysis for consequentialist evaluation. As they 
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 1. Hanoch Dagan & Roy Kreitner, Economic Analysis in Law, 38 YALE J. ON REG. 
(forthcoming 2021). 
 2. The normative use of economics for consequentialist evaluation does present prob-
lems that I do not address here. Perhaps the most significant difficulty concerns potential discrep-
ancies between an agent’s motivational preferences and her evaluative preferences. An agent’s 
motivations to act may diverge from her (or our) concept of well-being; an agent does not always 
do what makes her life go best.  For further discussion of different understandings of preference, 
see Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Domain of Preference, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 717, 728-9 (2003). 







note, economic analysts already pursue these.  In what follows, I put these 
uses of economics for consequentialist evaluation to one side.3  
In Part III, Dagan and Kreitner suggest two extensions of economic 
analysis to new uses “beyond its [economics’] comfort zone.”4 These ex-
tensions generally argue for the use of economics to address non-conse-
quentialist evaluations of legal rules or institutions. Such applications lie 
outside the comfort zone of economic analysis of law because economic 
analysis of law seeks to understand the consequences that legal rules and 
institutions create. 
In this essay, I focus on the uses of economic analysis in non-conse-
quentialist evaluations. I proceed in two steps. First, I consider the appli-
cations that Dagan and Kreitner suggest in their Part III. I argue that (a) 
economic analysis has already contributed to these inquiries; and (b) that 
Dagan and Kreitner have not adequately specified the task to be under-
taken. 
Second, I argue, through an extended example, that Dagan and Kreit-
ner have overlooked arguably the most significant use of economic analysis 
in non-consequentialist evaluation: the investigation of the logical relation 
among various values that we may endorse.  
I. Democracy, Deliberation and Self-Authorship 
In Part III, Dagan and Kreitner seek to expand the reach of economic 
analysis of law to inquiries that incorporate non-welfarist criteria.5 In this 
Part, I address Section B, which considers democracy and deliberation, and 
Section C, which considers self-authorship. With respect to Section B, I 
suggest that the literatures they hope for already exist, at least in nascent 
form. With respect to Section C, I express confusion about what Dagan 
and Kreitner want economists to do, as I do not think they have adequately 
specified either the values at issue or what they want done. 
My difficulties in understanding Dagan and Kreitner derive from their 
failure to specify clearly what role economics should play in these non-con-
sequential evaluations. The role of economics in consequential evaluations 
is clear as the analyst first determines what consequences a legal rule or 
                                               
 3. I also put to one side two other issues. First, I do not comment on their distinction 
between “economic analysis of law” and “economic analysis in law,” which I do not find wholly 
satisfying or clear because I do not fully understand or accept their account of legal theory which 
they develop at greater length elsewhere. See Hanoch Dagan & Roy Kreitner, The Character of 
Legal Theory, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 671 (2011). Second, both they and I ignore empirical studies. 
 4. Their Part III discusses three extensions, but the first, to questions of redistribution, 
seems to me to be an instance of consequentialist evaluation as distributional questions concern 
the consequences of various policies and behaviors. 
 5. As noted in the Introduction, Section III.A of Dagan and Kreitner’s article proposes 
the application of economics to distributive issues. The sentence in the text is thus not quite accu-
rate as distributive justice might include the distribution of welfare. On some definitions, these 
inquiries would be welfarist. I will not, however, discuss this suggestion. 







institution has.6 The structure of the theory, moreover, facilitates welfarist 
evaluation as the predicted consequences derive from the agents’ prefer-
ences. Neither of these conditions applies to non-consequentialist evalua-
tion. 
As a first step, then, it is important to determine what economists 
should do. The two examples Dagan and Kreitner offer suggest that eco-
nomics can solve or at least illuminate problems of measurement and ag-
gregation.7 
Consider democracy and deliberation first. “Democracy” is a very 
vague term; I am not sure what Dagan and Kreitner mean by it. Do they 
mean election of rulers through majority rule? Or do they mean something 
deeper? After all, in the United States, a large economic literature has de-
veloped around both the decision in Reynolds v. Sims8 that announced the 
principle of one person, one vote and the Voting Rights Act9 that prevents 
discrimination on the basis of race. These literatures developed indices of 
electoral power that had some influence on federal case law10 as well as 
techniques for measuring racially polarized voting and gerrymandering.11 
This literature is both theoretically and empirically rich; moreover, it has 
informed academic, legislative, and juridic debates.12 
Now consider deliberation. A literature exists here as well though per-
haps not as normatively relevant, as this literature seeks to understand how 
deliberation persuades and under what conditions it facilitates finding the 
truth.13 None of these works deals directly with law but it clearly awaits 
                                               
 6. The evaluation of institutions presents further problems as the consequences of an 
institution depend both on the set of individuals that populate the institution and the circum-
stances (or environment) in which the institution operates. Evaluating institutions thus requires 
evaluation of both factual and counterfactual situations. 
 7. Note, however, that these two aims appear to be at odds with the idea of non-conse-
quentialist evaluation as aggregation and measurement have a consequentialist tinge. Note also 
that measurement itself raises normative issues as any measure either implicitly or explicitly makes 
normative assumptions about the relative value of different aspects of the phenomenon measured. 
Measures of inequality, for example, implicitly distinguish between transfers that change the meas-
ure of inequality and transfers that do not. For a discussion see, for example, AMARTYA SEN, ON 
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY (2d ed. 1997). 
 8. 377 U.S. 533 (1964) 
 9. 52 U.S.C. §§ 10101, 10301-14, 10501-08, 10701-02. 
 10. See, e.g., John F. Banzhaf III, Weighted Voting Doesn't Work: A Mathematical 
Analysis, 19 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 317 (1964-1965). For a discussion, see Jean-Pierre Benoit & 
Lewis A. Kornhauser, Game-Theoretic Analyses of Legal Rules and Institutions, in 3 HANDBOOK 
OF GAME THEORY (R.J. Aumann & S. Hart eds., 2002).  
 11. The literature here is voluminous. On racially polarized voting, see, for example, Ber-
nard Grofman, Multivariate Methods and the Analysis of Racially Polarized Voting: Pitfalls in the 
Use of Social Science by the Courts, 72 SOC. SCI. Q. 826 (1991). On one person one vote, see, e.g., 
Nathaniel Persily, Thad Kousser, & Patrick Egan, The Complicated Impact of One Person, One 
Vote on Political Competition and Representation, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1299 (2002). On gerryman-
dering see, for example, Gregory Warrington, A Comparison of Partisan Gerrymandering 
Measures, 18 ELEC. L.J. 262 (2019).  
 12. One might argue that the literature sits not in economics but in political science, but 
most of the methods, both theoretic and empiric, are common to the two disciplines.  
 13. See, e.g., Dimitri Landa & Adam Meirowtiz, Game Theory, Information and Delib-
erative Democracy, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 427 (2009) for an article that may address some of the 







application to legal theory and, possibly, doctrinal development. These lit-
eratures, however, do not treat deliberation as an end in itself. Dagan and 
Kreitner might then have something else in mind, though I am unclear 
what. 
How do they understand the value of deliberation? Is it good for the 
agent who participates in the deliberation? On this account, deliberation 
would be a component of the agent’s well-being. Is it a valuable aspect of 
autonomy? Or is deliberation good, not for each deliberating agent, but for 
the deliberating agents together? This account treats deliberation either as 
an instrumental good or as a communal good.  
Consider now the value of self-determination. Dagan and Kreitner 
develop their argument through an example, agreements not to compete. 
They then suggest that economic analysis should advance the inquiry 
through the development of a method of aggregation across each time-t 
agent.  
They suggest that aggregating “self-determinations” should be no 
more difficult than the project of preference aggregation was. But we have 
a much thinner understanding of self-determination than of preferences. 
Preferences have more structure; they are rankings. And it is rankings that 
we aggregate. This structure helps both define and constrain the aggrega-
tion process. The nature of the ranking determines what information may 
be used in the aggregation and what assumptions need to be made to ag-
gregate. Arrow’s theorem aggregates ordinal rankings. Both the absence 
of intensity measures and of interpersonal comparability limit the ability 
to rank. 
What does it mean to aggregate self-determination? In the non-com-
petition example, Dagan and Kreitner consider a single agent whose de-
gree of autonomy varies over time because of the agreement not to com-
pete. We thus have an infinite number of agents t, each representing the 
single agent at a given time t. Each agent t could compare her situation in 
the presence of the agreement not to compete to her situation without 
(though we would have to be careful to specify what this counterfactual 
world looked like). We could aggregate these agents through majority 
rule.14 
Similarly, aggregation through majority rule over two alternatives ap-
plies straightforwardly to aggregation across individuals rather than within 
                                               
concerns that animate Dagan and Kreitner. Another literature on diversity of opinion implicitly 
relies on deliberation to yield its results. See, e.g., S.E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER 
OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES (2008); H. 
LANDEMORE, DEMOCRATIC REASON: POLITICS, COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE, AND THE RULE 
OF THE MANY (2017).  
 14. As there are an infinite number of voters, this would not be easy. We could take a 
majority vote for each time T and see if the result converges to a unique outcome. Note that we 
have, for each finite T, an axiomatic characterization of majority decision for two outcomes. 







individuals.15 Characterizing the counterfactual may become more difficult 
as one needs to determine what happens to each individual rather than 
merely specifying a history for a single individual. 
Two obvious problems, however, beset this procedure. First, why con-
sider only two alternatives? There are many possible counterfactual histo-
ries, at least some of which would correspond to distinct regulatory re-
gimes. Presumably, the agent should rank them all and the analyst should 
integrate these more complex rankings. The multiplicity of possible coun-
terfactuals renders the problem of determining the agent’s ranking more 
difficult.16 
Second, and more problematically, self-determination is unlikely to 
have a single dimension. Do Dagan and Kreitner want an aggregation for 
each dimension? Of each dimension into an all-self-determinations-things 
considered judgment? Each of these tasks requires a substantial amount of 
philosophical work before economists can grapple with an aggregation 
problem. 
II. Consistency Among Values 
Dagan and Kreitner do not discuss how economics can clarify norma-
tive thought. Social choice theorists, beginning with Kenneth Arrow, have 
examined the mutual consistency of various conditions.17 These investiga-
tions come in two types. First, one may provide an axiomatic characteriza-
tion of some value or institution. Kenneth May, in an early instance, pro-
vided a complete characterization of majority rule (over two 
alternatives).18 More recently, Eric Maskin has provided an axiomatization 
of utilitarianism,19 which permits an assessment against a prior characteri-
zation of leximin.20 These investigations can help clarify debate by identi-
fying more sharply what is at issue when one adopts one normative crite-
rion over another. 
                                               
 15. Across individuals, the aggregation is more straightforward as there is a finite num-
ber of individuals as opposed to a continuum of time slices of a single agent. 
 16. One might say that we have a measurement problem similar to the one that arises in 
the preference aggregation context. One might understand, as Dagan and Kreitner apparently do, 
cost-benefit analysis as a solution to that measurement problem. But cost-benefit analysis does 
not in fact solve all the measurement problems. See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, On Justifying 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 1037 (2000). 
 17. K.J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (3d ed. 2012). 
 18. K.O. May, A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Majority 
Rule, 20 ECONOMETRICA 680 (1952). 
 19. Eric Maskin, A Theorem on Utilitarianism, 45 REV. ECON. STUD. 93 (1978).  
 20. P.J. Hammond, Equity, Arrow’s Conditions and Rawls’ Difference Principle, 44 
ECONOMETRICA 793 (1976). Leximin derives from Rawls’ difference principle. It differs in two 
respects. First, the difference principle assesses differences in primary goods; leximin assesses dif-
ferences in well-being. Second, leximin compares policies first on the basis of the well-being of the 
worst-off. If the policies do not differ there, it considers the effects on the well-being of the second 
worst-off, and so on. It is not clear that Rawls’ difference principle has the same lexical character. 







A second strand of these conceptual investigations has a similar func-
tion. This strand identifies a set of plausible criteria of evaluation and then 
determines what institutions, if any, satisfy these criteria. Arrow’s theorem 
famously initiated this strand by proving the inconsistency of the Pareto 
Criterion, universal domain, non-dictatorship and independence of irrele-
vant alternatives. 
These studies are very abstract. One might consequently question 
their relevance for the more concrete questions that occupy legal theory 
and doctrine. In making normative judgments, however, it is important to 
understand what is at stake. Moreover, most applications of non-conse-
quentialist criteria to legal problems rely on ideal theories even though the 
legal setting is clearly non-ideal.21 
I shall illustrate this issue by suggesting that debates over efficiency in 
the law would be better informed if they paid more attention to the rich 
literature that has identified the tension between the Pareto Criterion and 
a wide variety of other, equally compelling normative intuitions. The Pa-
reto Criterion is the primary welfarist criterion that economists use to eval-
uate institutions (and actions).  
The Pareto criterion states that if each individual in the relevant soci-
ety ranks option x over option y, then society ranks x over y.22 This una-
nimity criterion seems both innocuous and highly intuitive. Indeed, some 
scholars consider the Pareto Criterion so intuitively compelling that they 
contend that any violation of it evidences the irrationality of the decision 
or decision criterion.23  
The Pareto Criterion is highly intuitive but, despite common belief, it 
is not innocuous. The style of analysis described above has shown that the 
Pareto Criterion is inconsistent with (1) the existence of communal goods; 
                                               
 21. Rawls’ theory of justice, for instance, is explicitly an ideal theory.  On the contrast 
between ideal and non-theory see, e.g., Alan Hamlin & Zofia Stemplowska, Theory, Ideal Theory, 
and the Theory of Ideals, 10 POL. STUD. REV. 48 (2012). 
 22. This sentence elides a number of issues. The Pareto Criterion is usually described in 
terms of preference; but “preference” is a technical term that designates a linear order (i.e. a rank-
ing) over some domain. A preference could then be any evaluative ranking including moral ones. 
Typically, the ranking at issue ranks options in terms of the agent’s well-being. A ranking based 
on the agent’s well-being, of course, may differ from the ranking that reflects the agent’s (all-
things-considered) motivations. For further discussion of the concept of “preference” see Jennifer 
Arlen & Lewis Kornhauser, Can the Law Change Preferences?, THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 
(forthcoming 2021). This essay treats the Pareto Criterion as a welfarist criterion. In some in-
stances, however, adherents ground the criterion not in welfare but in autonomy. They say, for 
example, not that society ranks x over y because each individual does so but because each individ-
ual has consented to x over y. But consent does not necessarily follow well-being. The intuitive 
appeal of the Pareto Criterion may thus conflate two distinct normative intuitions. For further 
discussion see Lewis Kornhauser, The Pareto Criterion (unpublished manuscript, on file with au-
thor). 
 23. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness vs. Welfare (2006). Kaplow and Shavell try 
to assimilate non-consequentialist criteria into the welfarist framework. They incorporate “tastes” 
for non-consequentialist values into the agent’s preferences. For an argument that this strategy of 
incorporation fails, see Lewis Kornhauser, Preference, Well-Being, and Morality in Social Deci-
sions, 32 J. LEG. STUD. 303 (2003). 







(2) aggregate rationality (under uncertainty); (3) fairness (as envy-free-
ness); (4) autonomy as “minimal” liberty; (5) autonomy as responsibility 
for one’s actions; and (6) autonomy as democratic self-governance. Each 
of these other ideas also has strong intuitive appeal. Their inconsistency 
suggests that our intuitions cannot be relied upon to integrate the various 
evaluative concerns that we hold. In the design or evaluation of our insti-
tutions, we may be required to choose one value over another. 
A. Communal Goods 
The Pareto Criterion rests on a principle of personal good that holds 
that something can be good for us only if it is good for someone. 24 Are 
there goods that can be good for no individual but good for us? For this 
claim to be true, “good for an individual” must mean something different 
from “good for us.” 
Consider equality. The agent’s well-being constitutes what is good for 
her. Of course, what is good for us should incorporate what is good for each 
of us. But it may incorporate more. It might, for instance, incorporate a 
concern for equality. Understanding individual and social good reveals 
how the Pareto Criterion and equality may conflict. 
Suppose that both individual and social good are welfarist in the sense 
that each depends only on the well-being of individuals.25 We may thus 
represent a state of the world x by the well-being xj enjoyed by each agent 
J; thus, x = (x1, x2, . . ., xn) where there are N individuals in the society. 
Recall that xj represents the well-being of agent J. A welfarist evaluates 
states of the world as a function W(x) of this vector of individual well-be-
ings. As the function W(x) may take any form, it is easy to see that a wel-
farist social welfare function need not satisfy the Pareto Criterion. 
A social concern for equality, for example, may imply that the social 
ordering does not satisfy the Pareto Criterion. Let W(x) = Σj xj - Σj(xj - μ)2 
where μ is average well-being in society. Society cares about aggregate 
well-being and equality; variance is a measure of inequality and as inequal-
ity increases, social value declines. This social welfare function is welfarist 
and violates the Pareto Criterion. Consider two allocations x = (1,1,1, ...,1) 
and y = (2, 2, . . . , 12,12). For ease of exposition assume that the size N of 
the society is even with precisely N/2 citizens having each of the two possi-
ble values of well-being. Every member of society prefers y to x because 
each person’s well-being is higher in y than in x but society prefers x to y 
W(x) = N while W(y) = 7N - 25N2 < W(x) (for N > 1). 
                                               
 24. See Larry Temkin, Harmful Goods, Harmless Bads, in VALUE, WELFARE AND 
MORALITY 292 (R.G. Frey & Christopher W. Morris eds., 2009). 
 25. This definition relies solely on the information that is necessary to determine indi-
vidual and social good. Some authors such as Kaplow and Shavell incorporate the Pareto Criterion 
into their definition of welfarism.  







The existence of communal goods is thus inconsistent with the Pareto 
Criterion. If we believe that equality is a communal good, we must choose 
between it and the Pareto-prescribed efficiency. 
B. Aggregate Rationality 
The prior subsection rests on an assumption that social good should 
depend on individual good. Democratic theory accepts the parallel as-
sumption that social policy should depend on each individual’s assessment 
of policy. In a world of uncertainty, policy desirability depends not only on 
an agent’s preferences but also on her beliefs about how that policy applies 
in varying states of the world. Economists generally assume that agents 
have preferences over actions that satisfy the axioms of subjective expected 
utility theory. Consequently, we may represent their preferences by a “util-
ity” function over outcomes and a set of beliefs represented by a probabil-
ity distribution over states of the world such that the agent prefers action 
A to action A’ if and only if the expected utility of A is greater than the 
expected utility of A’.26 
Aggregate rationality requires that the group of preferences over ac-
tions derive from the preferences of the individuals in the group, and, 
equally, satisfy the axioms of subjective utility and can thus be represented 
by an expected utility function. But this requirement implies that social 
preference will violate the Pareto Criterion whenever individuals have 
both conflicting interests and disparate beliefs.27 
The intuition behind this claim is quite clear.28 Consider an event E 
and its complement ~E. Let society consist of only two people J and K. 
Suppose person J thinks that E is more probable than ~E while K thinks 
that ~E is more probable than E. Now consider two outcomes x and y such 
that J prefers x to y while K is indifferent between them. Consider now the 
lotteries (x,y) and (y,x) where (x,y) means that x is paid in event E and y in 
event ~E. Given J’s beliefs, she prefers (x,y) to (y,x) and, as K is indifferent 
between them, the Pareto Criterion implies that society prefers (x,y) to 
(y,x). Moreover, from this social preference we can infer that society, if it 
conforms to the axioms of subjective expected utility theory,29 believes E 
is more probable than ~E. 
                                               
 26. Notice that these preferences over actions are meant to represent the agent’s well-
being as induced by these actions. In some sense, the preferences represent “expected” well-being 
rather than realized well-being. We might ask why we should value “expected well-being” at all.  
 27. See Teddy Seidenfeld, Joseph B. Kadane & Mark J. Schervish, On the Shared Pref-
erences of Two Bayesian Decision Makers, 86 J. PHIL. 225 (1989). JOHN BROOME, WEIGHING 
GOODS: EQUALITY, UNCERTAINTY, AND TIME (1995) discusses this conflict and opts for aban-
doning the Pareto Criterion for social preferences that satisfy the axioms of subjective expected 
utility theory. 
 28. This example is taken from BROOME, supra note 27 at 152-53. 
 29. This conclusion also relies on sufficient continuity in rewards. Let J’s valuation of x 
get closer and closer to indifference with y; then the range of beliefs about E that sustain his choice 
must get closer and closer to 50% and we must impute that same belief about E to society. 







Now consider a second pair of outcomes w and z such that K prefers 
w to z while J is indifferent between them. Now consider the two lotteries 
(w,z) and (z,w). K must prefer (z,w) to (w,z) as he thinks ~E is more likely 
than E. As J is indifferent between the two lotteries, the Pareto Criterion 
implies that society prefers (z,w) to (w,z). But again, if society conforms to 
the axioms of subjective expected utility theory, society believes ~E is 
more probable than event E. This inconsistency in probabilistic beliefs in-
dicates the inconsistency of the Pareto Criterion with the conception of 
aggregate rationality embedded in subjective expected utility theory.  
C. Fairness 
What allocations of goods and services are fair? One account, initially 
proposed by Duncan Foley, defines an allocation as fair when it is envy-
free.30 An allocation x = (x1, x2, . . ., xn) assigns a bundle xj of goods and 
services to each individual j in a society of n individuals. We assume that 
each individual ranks allocations solely in terms of her own bundle xj; that 
is, each individual has self-interested preferences.31 An allocation is envy-
free if each individual ranks her portion at least as highly as the portion of 
any other individual. Hal Varian proved that, for pure exchange econo-
mies, the competitive allocation from a society with an equal initial alloca-
tion of wealth is envy-free and, given the first welfare theorem, Pareto op-
timal.32 
This result follows quite intuitively. At the outset, before trade begins, 
the allocation is envy-free because each person has the same bundle of 
goods and services from which to trade. The initial allocation however may 
not be efficient. So trade under an efficient (competitive Walrasian) mech-
anism is instituted.33 The resulting allocation will be efficient. It remains 
envy-free because, given the competitive market and the equal initial allo-
cation, each party had the same “budget set” or set of bundles available in 
trade. Phrased differently, each person could have acquired the final bun-
dle of goods and services that any other market agent acquired. So each 
person must be at least as satisfied with her actual bundle than any other 
obtainable bundle. 
                                               
 30. Duncan K. Foley, Resource Allocation in the Public Sector, 7 YALE ECON. ESSAYS 
45, 73-76 (1967). Two mathematicians had earlier proposed a similar criterion. See L.E. Dubins & 
E.H. Spanier, How to Cut a Cake Fairly, 68 AM. MATHEMATICAL MONTHLY 1 (1961). 
 31. In fact, each agent need only have preferences over allocations that do not treat all 
allocations x that permute the individual bundles identically. 
 32. Hal R. Varian, Distributive Justice, Welfare Economics, and the Theory of Fairness, 
4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 240-47 (1975). 
 33. A Walrasian equilibrium is one in which no trades occur at non-equilibrium prices. 
There is a hypothetical auctioneer who posts prices until all markets clear and only then do trades 
occur. See GERARD DEBREU, THEORY OF VALUE: AN AXIOMATIC ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC 
EQUILIBRIUM (2d ed. 1972). 







Notice, however, the fragility of this result. If the initial allocation of 
goods and services is unequal then the final allocation will be efficient but 
probably not envy-free. The individual, call her R, with the largest initial 
share of resources faces better trading opportunities than the person, call 
her P, with the smallest initial share of resources. Obviously, P envies R’s 
initial allocation and that envy will remain after trade. 
Similarly, if the economy includes production then there may be no 
envy free allocations that are also Pareto optimal. This result follows be-
cause not all goods in a production economy are tradeable. Specifically, 
though each person has an equal amount of leisure, the labor of different 
individuals may command different prices. Lebron James commands a 
higher wage than most other people because his talent as a basketball 
player is scarce. I might thus envy James’ initial allocation of talent. 
D. Autonomy as Democratic Self-Governance: Representative 
Democracy 
Consideration of the normal electoral procedures for choosing legis-
latures (or assemblies) will clarify these distinctions. Consider a society 
that must make several legislative decisions: the extent and nature of 
health care to provide its citizenry, the form and extent of regulation of 
greenhouse gases, the scope and funding structure for a retirement pro-
gram, which public works projects to fund, etc. Arrow’s theorem assumes 
a framework of direct democracy.34 Each individual in society has prefer-
ences over all possible legislative programs. Arrow asks, given these indi-
vidual rankings of legislative programs, how should society rank these leg-
islative programs? 
Most societies, however, are representative democracies. Citizens 
have preferences over legislative programs, but they do not directly choose 
among them. Rather, they elect legislatures to enact a legislative program 
on their behalf. So, at best, the relevant choice procedure would ask indi-
viduals to rank legislatures rather than legislative programs. Rankings of 
legislatures might easily derive from our rankings of legislative programs 
as we might be able to identify each legislature with the legislative program 
it would enact. 
In our actual procedures, however, voters do not, in legislative elec-
tions, rank the different legislatures that might arise; rather voters choose 
candidates who then form the legislature. Voters care fundamentally about 
legislatures (or legislative programs) and only derivatively about candi-
dates.35 Suppose that voting occurs seat-by-seat; i.e., candidates declare for 
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particular seats and the votes are aggregated over each seat to identify the 
candidate that is chosen for that seat. Then a dictatorship is the only voting 
mechanism that produces a Pareto-optimal assembly for every (admissi-
ble) profile of individual rankings.36 
In this theorem, the Pareto Criterion conflicts directly with a non-dic-
tatorship requirement. The intuitions that lie behind these two evaluative 
criteria are both very strong. It is not obvious that we would reject non-
dictatorship in order to ensure that our electoral institutions satisfy the Pa-
reto Criterion. After all, dictatorship satisfies the Pareto Criterion because 
the dictator will always choose her top-ranked assembly. But all other vot-
ers may consider this assembly a very bad one; all might even rank it last. 
So, though it is good for the dictator, we have no reason to think that it is 
good for anyone else. Some other assembly, even an inefficient one, might 
better serve everyone else in society.37 
E. Autonomy as Liberty 
In 1970, Amartya Sen introduced “The Paradox of the Paretian Lib-
eral.”38 The paradox consists of a conflict between the Pareto Criterion and 
a condition of “liberalism” or, as I have phrased it, autonomy as liberty. 
Sen argued that individuals should have control over some aspect of their 
lives. He modeled this idea by stating that each individual had the power 
to determine the social ranking of some pair (x,y) of states. He then showed 
that for some preference profiles this liberal right, or this modicum of au-
tonomy, would lead to Pareto inferior outcomes. 
In Sen’s example, two individuals Prude (P) and Lewd (L) must de-
cide whether to read Lady Chatterley’s Lover. There are four possible 
states of the world: both read the book (B), neither reads the book (N), 
Prude only reads the book (P) and Lewd only reads the book (L). Suppose 
Lewd ranks the alternatives B > P > L > N while Prude ranks them N > P 
> L > B. Each has a right in the sense that Lewd can choose whether he 
reads the book or not while Prude can decide whether she reads the book 
or not. So Lewd chooses to read the book but Prude does not. State L 
                                               
assumes that there is a well-defined (and known) correspondence between the composition of the 
legislature and the legislative program enacted. Second, the framework here applies to all com-
monly used electoral procedures including party list proportional representation systems. In these 
systems, each party is the candidate and the legislature is formed with members of the parties in 
proportion to the number of votes received by the party. 
 36. Jean-Pierre Benoit & Lewis Kornhauser, Only a Dictatorship is Efficient, 70 GAMES 
& ECON. BEHAVIOR 261 (2010). A less technical account appears in Jean-Pierre Benoit & Lewis 
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Act, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1503 (1995). 
 37. Indeed, given a voter’s candidate ranking, we could infer her top-ranked assembly. 
From the candidate rankings we could then run a plurality rule election over assemblies. The win-
ning assembly would be Pareto optimal. But it might not be much better than the one chosen by a 
dictatorial rule because the winning assembly may have received very few votes.  
 38. Amartya Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. POL. ECON. 152 (1970). 







prevails even though both parties prefer the state P in which only Prude 
reads the book.  
F. Autonomy as Personal Responsibility 
The freedom to choose requires that the agent bear the consequences 
of her choices. A conception of autonomy must thus distinguish conse-
quences that are attributable to the agent’s choices from those conse-
quences that result from luck. Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, introduced 
the question of characterizing results for which the agent is responsible into 
the debate on justice.39 Rawls famously argued that the agent was not re-
sponsible for her innate talents and then offered an account of what justice 
required to those with bad luck. Dworkin’s elaboration of a theory of jus-
tice focused on equality of resources.40 Dworkin emphasized that the agent 
had responsibility for the consequences of her autonomous choices. His 
argument heavily relied on a distinction between “brute luck” and “option 
luck”; the agent was not responsible for brute luck but was responsible for 
option luck.41 
This structure of analysis obviously connects to the questions of re-
sponsibility and to Dworkin’s distinction between brute and option luck. 
To define an economy, one must specify the total available set of resources 
and two sets of individual characteristics, those for which the agent is re-
sponsible and those for which she is not. Her well-being depends both on 
her share of the endowment of goods and on her characteristics, both those 
for which she is responsible and those for which she is not responsible. 
The distinction between brute and option luck means, first, that those 
individuals with identical characteristics for which they are responsible 
should have identical well-being. Second, that individuals with identical 
characteristics for which they are not responsible – i.e., individuals with 
identical brute luck – should receive identical compensation for their loss. 
The compatibility of these two requirements, however, depends on the na-
ture of the correlate of the effects of brute and option luck on the agent’s 
well-being. If the well-being of agents with bad luck are unusually respon-
sive to that brute luck, no equilibrium that satisfies the Pareto Criterion 
will exist.42 
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G. Section 2 Summary 
Economic analyses of a rule R often evaluate the performance of R in 
the model; R is either efficient or not efficient (or sometimes second- or 
third-best). To some economic analysts of law this judgment is fundamen-
tal; the normative desirability of the Pareto Criterion is a bedrock assump-
tion, the truth of which is intuitively obvious. The Pareto Criterion does, 
indeed, have a strong normative appeal. If each person is better off in x 
than in y, how could it not be the case that x is socially better than y? 
This section has discussed six reasons that economists have offered to 
reject the Pareto Criterion. As plausible and innocuous as it may appear, 
it conflicts with other evaluative intuitions that have a correspondingly 
strong pull. 
The argument of this section, however, is methodological as well as 
substantive. Each of the six reasons derives from a formal analysis of the 
logical compatibility of the Pareto Criterion with each of six other evalua-
tive criteria.  
Conclusion 
Dagan and Kreitner have rightly argued for the use of economic anal-
ysis of law in non-consequentialist evaluation. I have argued that, nonethe-
less, they have underestimated both the set of methodologies that may ad-
vance our understanding and the extent to which the methodologies they 
indicate have already contributed to legal theory.  
More significantly, normative economic theory advances both conse-
quentialist and non-consequentialist evaluation in a way that Dagan and 
Kreitner do not identify. Economists have investigated the logical compat-
ibility of a number of evaluative criteria. In particular, they have shown 
that the intuitively compelling, and superficially weak, Pareto Criterion 
conflicts with many other intuitively appealing evaluative criteria such as 
liberty, responsibility, self-governance, and fairness.   
These investigations rely on a clear specification of each of the criteria 
studied. Clear specification must thus precede the analysis of logical com-
patibility. Similarly, measurement and aggregation too require the same 
prior specification of the value to be measured or aggregated. The task of 
specification of these values is not obviously an economic one but the 
shared task of scholars of many disciplines. 
 
